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It may be difficult at first glance to see much unity in
the articles which make up this issue of the IDS
Bulletin. They come from different sources and express
a variety of viewpoints. Four of them (Fontaine,
Booth, Harriss and Manor) were presented as papers
to a workshop on 'The Developmental State in
Retreat' held at IDS on 30 June-! July, 1987. Mick
Moore's article is a critical rejoinder to the debate on
the state in Africa which was published in the January
1986 issue of this journal. Gordon White's article
could be grouped with the first four since, while it was
not presented at the workshop, it too deals with the
'retreat of the state', albeit in the highly specific
Chinese context. Roberts's article, in contrast,
represents a somewhat isolated, if not eccentric,
approach to understanding the peculiar experience of
economic policy reorientation in contemporary
Algeria.
Beneath this superficial diversity, however, certain
common themes can be discerned. All seven articles
are concerned with the political aspects and
implications of contemporary controversies in
development policy thinking. Each of them deals with
one or more of the key questions which arise once
earlier orthodoxies regarding the 'developmental role'
of the state in Third World countries are called into
question. It is the very variety and number of these
questions which account for the diversity of the
articles published here. At the risk then of simplifying
certain positions and overlooking others, we can
identify the following questions which are addressed
in this issue.
Are we witnessing a general trend towards the
economic 'disinvolvement' or 'retreat' of the
'developmental state' throughout the Third World?
Grounds for doubting this are adduced by several
contributors. As David Booth points out, there is
certainly a world-wide ideological trend in this sense,
but its translation into reality is another matter.
Where tropical Africa is concerned, Booth argues for
attaching primacy to factors specific to the region in
explaining such 'retreats' as may be occurring, and this
line of thought is reinforced in different ways by the
contributions of Harriss and Manor on the one hand,
and White and Roberts on the other.
Although they discuss the Indian case from different
analytical perspectives, Harriss and Manor clearly
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agree on the insubstantial character of economic
liberalisation in India over the last two years and the
strength of those features of the Indian economy and
polity disposed to resist it. While they are careful to
present the Indian experience as exceptional - the
case of 'the dog that did not bark' - and thus tacitly
accept that there is a general trend, their analyses
highlight the salience of local factors, the specific
character of a given state and economy, in determining
the extent to which economic liberalisation, privati-
sation or associated policy shifts are feasible and
likely.
Ironically, the same point emerges from the analyses
of White and Roberts. The irony lies in the fact that in
both the Chinese and the Algerian cases, very
substantial changes in economic policy, in the
direction of liberalisation and privatisation, have
indeed taken place in recent years. As such, it is no
doubt tempting to claim both of these experiences as
important or even characteristic instances of a global
trend in the world economy and its reflection in
current 'development' discourse. Yet, in both cases,
there are strong grounds for the view that economic
reform has been a deliberate response to specific
internal and primarily political considerations rather
than to external forces. In China, White argues, the
adoption of a wide-ranging programme of economic
reforms should be understood primarily in terms of
the logic of development of the Leninist state, a logic
which, we may add, should in no way be confused with
current world economic trends; there is, after all,
nothing new about communist states adopting
important measures of economic reform, including
the freeing (within limits) of market forces and a
degree of toleration of private ownership. lt follows
that if the experience of China post-Mao is to be
assimilated to anything, it should be assimulated to
that of the USSR after Stalin rather than, say, the
current 'retreat of the state' in tropical Africa. In
short, this experience may more realistically be
conceived as contributing to the appearance of a
global trend than as a reflection of it. Much the same
conclusion could be drawn from Roberts's analysis of
the Algerian case, in which he points out that the
reorientation of economic policy was primarily a
reflection of internal political imperatives, and
represented not a sea-change in the Algerian state but
rather the reassertion of its constitutive principles.
Editorial
With regard to tropical Africa, different but equally
important grounds for scepticism are briefly adduced
by Fontaine in his reference to the cases of Burkina
Fasso and the Ivory Coast. The first offers the
spectacle of a revolutionary regime embarking, of its
own volition, upon a wide ranging and even drastic
programme of precisely the kind of economic reforms
recommended by the World Bank, without any World
Bank intervention, while simultaneously reinforcing
the institutional instruments of its ambition to
command and direct the society (the developing
country-wide network of Committees for the Defence
of the Revolution). The second, traditionally cited as a
locus classicus of the liberal development model, at
any rate in the tropical African context, and as such an
early anticipation of the new norm, furnishes by
contrast an instance offormal privatisation obscuring
the reality of continuing, if now informal, political
control inasmuch as the parastatals in question are
privatised merely to the intimates of the country's
president. In other words, what is dubbed rather
hastily as the 'retreat of the state' or 'economic
liberalisation' may in fact involve not so much a
reduction in the degree of state involvement in the
economy as modifications in the forms of this
involvement, at least in certain cases.
In other respects, Fontaine's argument may appear to
contradict that of the authors cited above, at least in
his insistence that 'economic liberalising tendencies.
were not initiated domestically but largely resulted
from international modifications, the forms of
adaptation to which were not chosen by the countries
themselves . . .' But since he is speaking only of sub-
Saharan Africa in this context, the contradiction is
more apparent than real. It is perfectly consistent to
argue, with Booth, that factors specific to the region
account for such 'disinvolvement' as is occurring and
for the fact that this process has been largely forced on
sub-Saharan African states from outside.
One possible implication of this is that we may begin
to develop a typology in which we distinguish between
i) those states where the central government is unable
to carry through substantial economic liberalisation
because of the resistance of powerful vested interests
(e.g. India); ii) states endowed with strong governments
which are able to carry through substantial economic
reforms in an autonomous manner vis-à-vis external
influences and in a way which enables them to
conserve the essential features of their commanding
relationship vis-à-vis the society (e.g. China, Algeria,
Burkina Fasso?); iii) states where the emancipation of
economic activity from political interference or
control is more a matter of form than substance (e.g.
the Ivory Coast), and iv) states with weak governments
which have overreached themselves in their attempt to
direct and control economic activity and have been
obliged to bow to external pressures for economic
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liberalisation (as in much of sub-Saharan Africa), in
such a way that a qualitative change in the relationship
between state and society may be occurring.
The main implications of the fourth case are addressed
by both Fontaine and Booth. Does the 'retreat of the
state' in this sense, at any rate in tropical Africa, imply
the development of 'civil society'? In particular, will it
see the emergence, out of the existing essentially
plastic and state-dependent, class structure, of new
class forces and, first and foremost, new bourgeoisies
capable of asserting their collective interests and
autonomous control over expanding spheres of
production and exchange?
Fontaine, once again, furnishes arguments for
caution. He suggests that the development of capitalist
relations of production in tropical Africa over the last
two decades has not been accompanied by the
development of bourgeois classes or 'proto-bourgeois
groups' characterised by the degree of economic and
political coherence required for them to be able to
develop independently within the new politico-
economic context of limited and largely indirect state
intervention. Citing the Ivory Coast and Kenyan
cases, he reminds us of the extent to which strong
political connections have been indispensable to 'the
various social groups engaged in production and
accumulation' and tacitly suggests that the clientelist
habits and routines established during the first two or
three decades of independence will not be easily
broken. Moreover, he points out that the social groups
which are most likely to prove capable of taking full
advantage of the economic retreat of the state are
precisely those which have depended least upon occult
political connections in the past, for the excellent
reason that they were unable to do so in principle
the various communities which, notwithstanding
their formal status as 'nationals', are perceived by the
rest of the scciety as foreign: the Asians in East Africa
and the Syrio-Lebanese in West Africa being the
classic examples. And, precisely because such groups
might be expected to benefit disproportionately from
substantial economic liberalisation, such liberalisation
is likely to carry prohibitive political costs for African
governments, who are correspondingly unlikely to
embark upon it.
The argument which Fontaine sketches here con-
cerning 'foreign' or 'expatriate' groups could be
regarded as a particular instance of a wider argument
which he does not make. A culturally determined
propensity to engage successfully in entrepreneurial
activities without the benefit of privileged access to the
state is not confined to such groups; they are merely
the most visible instances of it. In a number of African
and Asian countries culturally distinct elements of the
indigenous population can be identified which also
exhibit such propensities. In West Africa, the tbos of
Nigeria are an obvious example of this; in North
Africa, the Kabyle and Mozabite Berbers of Algeria
could be cited; in East Africa, the Baganda of Uganda
come to mind. Most of these groups not only occupy
extremely important positions within the economic
life of their respective countries, but also stand in an
ambiguous and often problematic relationship to the
state in so far as the state is based upon a political
coalition from which they have in practice been largely
excluded. This wider argument reinforces Fontaine's
doubts concerning the political feasibility of sub-
stantial economic liberalisation in many African
states. Alternatively, should external pressure for
liberalisation prove stronger than resistance to it
mustered by vested interests represented in the ruling
political coalition, we may expect substantive
liberalisation of the economy to be accompanied by
important changes not achieved without conflict in the
composition of the ruling coalition.
A different line of thought is developed by Booth.
Supposing that the 'retreat of the state' in tropical
Africa does facilitate the emergence of new socio-
economic interest groups, what are the possible
implications ofthis, first, for agricultural development
in particular and, second, for the future of the state
itself'?
In answer to the first question, Booth identifies two
main possibilities. Given the findings of much well-
known research, notably that of Lipton and of Bates,
concerning the deleterious effects upon agriculture of
the policies pursued by African 'developmental
states', he points out that, pace the radical-egalitarian
critics of the new economic liberalism, the emergence
of new private sector groups may be the best or even
the only way of sustaining a more balanced and
equitable pattern of development in tropical Africa.
But he also acknowledges that the influence of new
elite farmer groups may have the opposite effect, that
of consolidating or even aggravating the existing
pattern of bias, by extracting concessions from the
state to particular interests which are socially and
perhaps also regionally specific. Such concessions
would not only entail the continuing neglect of other
rural interests (other classes, other regions) but might
actually occur at their expense, in so far as they are
financed by cuts in basic needs provision and other
services benefiting the rural poor in general. Thus the
rise of an elite farmer class could have diametrically
opposed effects on the structures of economic
inequality and bias, either eroding these structures or
reinforcing them. lt should be a priority of future
research, he suggests, to identify the conditions under
which each of these possibilities is more likely to
occur.
In answer to the second question, Booth argues that it
is necessary to distinguish between the question of the
development of the state-society relationship and the
question of the state itself. Like Moore, he insists on
the need to jettison simple-minded conceptions of the
'strength' or 'weakness' of the state. The 'retreat of the
state' may well imply the weakening of the state in
relation to society, in sofar as it corresponds to, or
stimulates, a development of civil society which places
new limitations on the scope for arbitrary action of the
state and thereby reduces its power to coerce the
society. But it need not imply the weakening of the
state in other respects, in that the development of civil
society may have the effect of imposing a kind of
discipline upon the state which actually enhances its
capacity to perform its functions effectively and realise
its objectives. Thus a reduction in the notional scope
of the state may go hand in hand with an increase in its
real capacities.
At issue here is whether or not the 'retreat of the state',
in tropical Africa in particular, is likely to imply the
development of civil society. This question is literally
unanswerable for as long as an inadequate conception
of 'civil society' is entertained by social scientists
working in the field of development studies. There is a
real danger that 'civil society' will merely become the
latest buzz-word in academic debates and that these
debates will be sterile because conducted with debased
conceptual currency. This is a point which Booth
addresses, but there is a case for taking the discussion
further.
Two diametrically opposed errors need to be avoided
if the concept of 'civil society' is to be of any analytical
use in contemporary development studies. The first is
to use 'civil society' as a pretentious synonym for
'society', with no recognition of the difference between
the two. This confusion makes it impossible to
distinguish between a state which is 'weak' in relation
to society because it is 'soft', swamped by what some
authors have chosen to call 'the economy of affection'
- invested by occult patron-client networks and
'gangrened' [Etienne 1977:92] by clan politics rooted
in primordial kinship and ethnic solidarities, and a
state which is 'weak' in relation to society because
confronted by self-sustaining voluntary associations
articulating group interests which remain distinct
from the general interest which it is the business of the
state to uphold.
The reason why it is desirable to distinguish between
these two cases is that in the first, the distinction
between private and public domains and particular
and general interests cannot be made, because the two
spheres are systematically confused, to the detriment
of the state's capacity to uphold the public/general
interest and acquire legitimacy from its perceived
success in doing so. In the second case, the distinction
is sharply drawn, the different spheres do not interfere
with each other so much as interact in ways susceptible
to legal regulation, the domain of the state is clearly
demarcated and the legitimacy which the state derives
from the effective performance of its proper functions
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within this domain is not in question [Roberts 1983].
The second error is to use 'civil society' in too limited a
sense, as a synonym for 'bourgeois' or 'capitalist'
society. 'Bourgeois society' would be a perfectly
reasonable translation of bürgerliche Gesellschaft, had
not Marxism succeeded in identifying 'bourgeois' with
'capitalist'. Since it has, it is better to stick to 'civil' as
the correct translation of bürgerliche. For, while it is
undoubtedly the case that, historically, the rise of civil
society, in contradistinction both to the domain of the
family and that of the state, has gone together with the
development of capitalism, it does not follow that
'civil society' is merely capitalist society under another
name. The dominance of capitalism as a mode of
production is no guarantee of the existence of 'civil
society', any more than the supersession of capitalism,
other than by totalitarian varieties of socialism, need
imply the end of 'civil society'.
In stigmatising these usages as 'errors', I do not mean
to imply that 'civil society' cannot be used in these
ways. Of course it can. It has been used with various
meanings by political philosophers since the 17th
century at least. But if its use is to assist us in gauging
the implications of current developments in post-
colonial states, it must be precise, and this precision
can be achieved only if its use is controlled by a clear
purpose. Our purpose is to ascertain whether the
changes in prospect in the relationship between state
and society in tropical Africa and elsewhere, in
consequence of the 'retreat of the state' from its former
prerogatives and pretensions in economic affairs, are
likely to stimulate the development of new social
forces which, as Booth puts it, 'are capable of
imposing new standards of public morality on
politicians and bureaucrats' and thereby have the
effect of strengthening the state's capacities. This
purpose can best be served, I suggest, if we conceive
'civil society', i1ter a/ia, in terms of the ideas of
citizenship and the rule of law.
The concept of 'civil society' should be understood to
pertain to a society of citizens. Fundamental to it is the
idea of enfranchisement. A society of disfranchised
subjects is not a 'civil society' in this sense. Nor should
the idea of 'civil society' be reduced, as Bayart's
formulation (cited by Booth) might suggest, to the
concept of 'society in its relations to the state . . . in so
far as it is in confrontation with the state', for it is
unclear that there are any boundaries to the
applicability of this concept; all societies, other than a
stateless one, may be said to be 'in confrontation with
the state'. Rather, 'civil society' exists where society
enjoys a particular kind of regular (not occasional)
relationship to the state, founded upon the fact of
enfranchisement in its substantive rather than merely
formal sense and thus upon the existence of the
effective status of citizen which its members possess,
with all the rights vis-à-vis the state which this status
entails.
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If we bear in mind Hegel's notion that 'civil society' is
the domain of competing particular and private
interests, while the state is the domain of the general or
'universal' interest, that the boundary between the two
is, at least in principle, a clear one, and is sustained on
both sides by a clear conception of the rights which
pertain to each. We can thus see that it follows that the
existence of 'civil society' is also inherently bound up
with the existence of a developed system of law and the
fact that the state itself, in certain critical respects, is
subject to this system. The truth of this can be
established negatively by reference to the Soviet
experience. The obliteration of civil society accom-
plished by the Bolsheviks, and legitimised ideologically
by the doctrinaire identification of civil society and
capitalism, was made possible only to the extent that
law itself was abolished; the dictatorship of the
proletariat, as Lenin repeatedly drummed into his
colleagues, had to be 'a state unbound by law', and it
was [Clifford 1985].
To determine whether or not the 'retreat of the state'
implies the development of civil society in this sense,
we need to find out, in each particular case, whether it
entailing not only the enlargement, in Booth's words,
of 'the sphere of voluntary association and market-
oriented behaviour regulated by law' but also the
development of substantive, as opposed to merely
formal, citizenship and the attendant panoply of civil
rights and liberties guaranteed by a system of law
which is itself independent of the particular holders of
political power at any one time as well as of the
pressures of primordial loyalties.
A corollary of subscribing to this demanding
conception of 'civil society' is that we cannot expect a
rapid or comprehensive development of state-society
relations along these lines in tropical Africa in the near
future. But the validity of the concept does not depend
upon its being applicable to these countries in the
immediate future, but upon its usefulness in our
attempts to interpret current changes and gauge their
longer-run significance. For what is at issue is whether
or not the 'retreat of the state' in Africa will open up
new directions of social and political change, leading
to the establishment of fundamentally new relation-
ships between state and society conducive to economic
and social development, or whether it will prove to
have been a false dawn, characterised by political and
economic 'liberalisations' of equal spuriousness.
These considerations have a direct bearing upon the
place of political research and analysis in development
studies, an issue addressed at some length by Moore.
As Fontaine, an economist, remarks, 'the question...
will the disinvolvement of the state create conditions
for an effective market mechanism to work? . . . can
only be answered on the basis of political, historical
and sociological findings'. The matter was put in a
nutshell years ago by E. B. Pashukanis, the brilliant
Bolshevik theorist of the proletarian dictatorship as a
state without law, when he observed that 'economics
achieves its potential through the non-economic'
[Pashukanis 1929]. It is almost inconceivable that the
present 'retreat of the state' in tropical Africa will
initiate a development of civil society conducive to the
proper functioning of the market mechanism unless it
also precipitates the development of new forms of
politics within tropical African society. As long as it
remains an exclusive affair of civil servants and
planners experimenting with new formulae for state
policy, it can be relied upon to remain politically and
socially barren, and the 'economic' will fail to achieve
its potential.
That concept of 'forms of politics' is likely to be
unfamiliar to the reader is an index of the extent to
which political analysis, properly so called has been
absent from the debates within development studies.
In place ofa serious consideration of politics, there has
developed an almost obsessive preoccupation with
'the state', discussion of which has been dominated for
at least the last decade by the theoretical assumptions
and perspectives of political economy. Political economists
have often acknowledged the 'relative autonomy of
the state' or of 'the political'. But formal acknow-
ledgement of this in the abstract is one thing; actually
investigating and analysing that to which this 'relative
autonomy' is attributed is something else altogether.
The value of political economy lies in the way it
complements the work of political science, among
other disciplines. What it cannot be is a satisfactory
substitute for political science.
The complementarity of the analytical approaches of
political economy and political science is amply
demonstrated by the two articles on India in this issue.
Harriss's explanation of the 'half-heartedness' of the
recent attempt at economic liberalisation in terms of
the long-run fiscal problem of the Indian state and the
conflicting interests and the balance of forces within
the class coalition which underpins it offers a very
different perspective from that provided by Manor's
exploration of Rajiv Gandhi's assumptions and
(mis)calculations, the nature and evolution of
Congress machine-and-pork barrel politics and the
structure of the Indian polity. But these two
perspectives are not mutually exclusive: are both
essential to a rounded understanding of the case in
question. But the complementarity exemplified here is
made possible by the fact that, in India, a well-
established system of state and politics exists. Because
it is well established, the extent to which policy is
determined by features of the political economy can be
identified, as can the influence of specifically political
factors. None of this necessarily applies everywhere
else, least of all in tropical Africa, where the question
of the 'retreat of the state' is inseparable from the
question of the 'failure of the state'.
The implications of this are explored in depth by
Moore, whose article provides a timely and thorough
analysis of the limitations of political economy in this
context. As he points out, 'the application of political
economy assumes the existence of the state apparatus
itself and therefore assumes away what some
observers believe to be a (or the) key question about
contemporary Africa: the non-existence of the
material and/or cultural preconditions for the
effective functioning of governments'. In other words,
political economy can explain the content and
evolution of economic policy in a given state, but it has
nothing to say about the particular character of the
state itself. It deals with the material basis of the
political structure (namely, the economic structure),
but does not deal with the nature of the political
structure directly. Moreover, it tends to an entirely
mechanistic conception of the political structure, and
in assuming that this machine is driven by factors
outside itself, entirely overlooks the ghost in the
machine, the form of politics which animates it, and by
which the influence of external pressures and
underlying economic factors is mediated.
The behaviour of states is unquestionably influenced
by economic factors, but the construction and
constitution of states is another matter. States are not
emanations from the economic essence of society, they
are political constructs, that is they are deliberately
constructed by particular forms of politics and their
constitutions are determined by the character of those
forms. And they are in reality constitutive of society
rather than derivative of it.
The effective constitution of a state is not a piece of
paper. Outside Western Europe and North America,
the piece of paper in question is almost invariably
window-dressing, which is to say a pious fraud. The
only state in the world which actually takes its piece of
paper in dead earnest is the USA, and the American
constitution, as Bernard Shaw once observed, 'was a
guarantee to the whole American nation that it never
should be governed at all' [Shaw 1933]. Everywhere
else the effective constitution of the state is not some
document, but the set of principles upon which it is
founded and in accordance with which it must needs
be governed or else. The United Kingdom has no piece
of paper, but it has an effective constitution, a set of
constitutive principles, the brilliant description of
which by Walter Bagehot ought to be one of the
founding texts of political science, but is in fact widely
forgotten. The relevance of the analysis of a state's
constitutive principles to the understanding of the
processes by which its economic policy and role are
recast, and the way in which these principles are
determined by the particular form of politics at the
origin of the state are illustrated in Roberts's
discussion of the Algerian case.
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The problem of the state in tropical Africa, and in
many other post-colonial societies as well, is a political
rather than an economic problem. It is a question of
the nature, strength and coherence of the principles
upon which the state is constituted, and of the ability
of these principles to facilitate - or at least not inhibit
- the development of the social and political forces
and processes which combine to form the non-
economic medium through which the economic can
achieve its potential.
It is not the business of political economy to address
these questions and it is not equipped to do so. That
academic political science, in its current state, can
address these questions effectively cannot be taken for
granted, but it is certainly its business to do so.
Whether or not development studies can afford, in the
short and medium term, not only to acknowledge but
also to accommodate the claims of political science in
this respect remains to be seen.
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